Economics at your fingertips  

Interim bribery in auctions

Sevket Alper Koc and William Neilson ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 238-241

Abstract: Bidders can bribe the auctioneer before they bid, with the auctioneer lowering the winner's bid if the winner paid the bribe. In equilibrium bidders employ a cutoff strategy and corruption affects neither efficiency nor the bidders' expected payoffs.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nithya Sathishkumar ().

Page updated 2021-03-28
Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:238-241