Interim bribery in auctions
Sevket Alper Koc and
William Neilson ()
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 238-241
Bidders can bribe the auctioneer before they bid, with the auctioneer lowering the winner's bid if the winner paid the bribe. In equilibrium bidders employ a cutoff strategy and corruption affects neither efficiency nor the bidders' expected payoffs.
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