Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information

Geoffroy de Clippel

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 265-267

Abstract: Varian's (Varian, H., 1974. Equity, Envy and Efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory 9, 63-91) main results are not valid anymore if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting: 1) envy-freeness and efficiency may be incompatible; 2) there may exist efficient allocation rules such that every agent envies another. Two weaker positive properties are formulated.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Equity, Envy and Efficiency under Asymmetric Information (2004)
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