Nash implementability of the plurality rule over restricted domains

Remzi Sanver

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 298-300

Abstract: We give a complete characterization of preference domains over which the plurality rule is Nash implementable. We show that the plurality rule fails Nash implementability on every domain except those which are "monotonically trivial".

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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