Nash implementability of the plurality rule over restricted domains
Remzi Sanver ()
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 298-300
We give a complete characterization of preference domains over which the plurality rule is Nash implementable. We show that the plurality rule fails Nash implementability on every domain except those which are "monotonically trivial".
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:298-300
Access Statistics for this article
Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office
More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().