The convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities

Sunku Hahn

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 304-306

Abstract: This paper proved that a fictitious play always converges in I × J games with strategic complementarities.

Date: 2008
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