The convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 304-306
This paper proved that a fictitious play always converges in I × J games with strategic complementarities.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:304-306
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