A climate agreement with full participation

Camilla Bretteville Froyn and Jon Hovi

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 317-319

Abstract: Using a repeated-game model, we demonstrate that by limiting the punishment for non-compliance, a climate agreement with full participation can be sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium even without watering down abatement levels.

Date: 2008
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