Eliciting demand information through cheap talk: An argument in favor of a ban on price discrimination
Lars Frisell and
Johan Lagerlof ()
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 3, 421-424
A uniform pricing rule may enable the communication of demand information from buyer to seller in situations where this would not have been possible if the seller could price discriminate. Importantly, such a rule can benefit both buyer and seller.
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