Jump bidding in ascending auctions: The case of takeover contests
Christian At and
Pierre-Henri Morand ()
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 3, 458-460
This paper analyses jump bidding in ascending auctions in the case of takeover contests. The free riding condition explains that some jumps can occur driven by the own bidders free-rider condition. We also show that ascending auction can be inefficient.
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Working Paper: Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions: the Case of Takeover Contests (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:458-460
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