Jump bidding in ascending auctions: The case of takeover contests

Christian At and Pierre-Henri Morand ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 3, 458-460

Abstract: This paper analyses jump bidding in ascending auctions in the case of takeover contests. The free riding condition explains that some jumps can occur driven by the own bidders free-rider condition. We also show that ascending auction can be inefficient.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions: the Case of Takeover Contests (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:458-460

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