Nash implementation in pure public good economies
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 3, 470-473
I study Nash implementation in a model of pure public good economies without the controversial no veto power condition. I prove that any social choice correspondence that is monotonic and satisfies unanimity and minimal liberty can be implemented in Nash equilibrium.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:470-473
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