Nash implementation in pure public good economies

Lin Zhou

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 3, 470-473

Abstract: I study Nash implementation in a model of pure public good economies without the controversial no veto power condition. I prove that any social choice correspondence that is monotonic and satisfies unanimity and minimal liberty can be implemented in Nash equilibrium.

Date: 2008
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