Hybrid auctions revisited
Dan Levin () and
Lixin Ye ()
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 3, 591-594
We examine hybrid auctions with affiliated private values and risk-averse bidders, and show that the optimal hybrid auction trades off the benefit of information extraction in the ascending-bid phase and the cost of reduced competition in the sealed-bid phase.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:591-594
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