Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case with transferable utility
Robert Evans and
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 3, 611-614
Bester and Strausz [Bester, H., Strausz, R., 2001. Contracting with imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the single agent case. Econometrica 69, 1077-1098] showed that the revelation principle is invalid in a multi-agent, no-commitment setting. We show that if transfers are possible it does apply in their setting unless at least two agents have private information.
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Working Paper: Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: the Multi-Agent Case with Transferable Utility (2007)
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