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Migrant wages, remittances and recipient labour supply in a moral hazard model

Claire Naiditch and Radu Vranceanu

Economic Systems, 2009, vol. 33, issue 1, 60-82

Abstract: This paper analyzes the interaction between migrants' income and remittances and between remittances and the labour supply of residents. The model is cast as a two-period game with imperfect information about the residents' real economic situation. Residents subject to a good economic situation may behave as if they were in a poor economic situation only in order to manipulate remitters' expectations. The latter, being aware of this risk, reduce the remitted amount accordingly. Therefore, in the equilibrium, residents who really are victims of the bad economic outlook are penalized as compared to the perfect information set-up. In some circumstances, they can signal their type by drastically cutting working hours, thus further enhancing their precarity right when their economic situation is the worst.

Keywords: Migrants; Remittances; Perfect; Bayesian; Equilibrium; Labour; supply; Signaling; Altruism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Migrant wages, remittances and recipient labour supply in a moral hazard model (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Migrant wages, remittances and recipient labour supply in a moral hazard model (2009) Downloads
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