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Environmental taxes in a differentiated mixed duopoly

Leonard F.S. Wang and Jean Wang

Economic Systems, 2009, vol. 33, issue 4, 389-396

Abstract: Beladi and Chao (2006) and Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2006) considered the role of environmental policy on the decision whether to privatize a public firm in different market structures. This paper re-examines whether privatization improves (or deteriorates) the environment in a mixed duopolistic framework with differentiated product and pollution abatement. It is shown that, due to privatization, less attention is paid to pollution abatement by all the firms coupled with less environment taxes levied by the government in a differentiated duopoly, and the environment is more (less) damaged when the product is less (more) substitutable. When the product is highly substitutable, industry profits increase because this softens the intensity of the product market, but social welfare deteriorates accompanied with the path of privatization because the loss of consumer surplus and tax revenue exceeds the increases in profits, even if the environment is less damaged.

Keywords: Environmental; taxes; Mixed; oligopoly; privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecosys:v:33:y:2009:i:4:p:389-396