The effect of judicial independence on entrepreneurship in the US states
John Dove
Economic Systems, 2015, vol. 39, issue 1, 72-96
Abstract:
The relationship between institutional quality, entrepreneurship, and economic growth has been well documented within the literature. However, much less work has been done regarding judicial independence and how this affects, specifically, entrepreneurial activity. Therefore, this paper attempts to fill that gap by exploiting the differences in judicial independence that exist between the US states and empirically evaluating how this affects entrepreneurship. Overall, the results suggest that the method of selecting and retaining justices of both courts of last resort and intermediate appellate courts has a significant and direct effect on entrepreneurial activity, though the latter result is somewhat less robust. The presence of judicial nominating and retention commissions also has a significant and direct effect. Further, although somewhat weaker, the method of selecting the chief justice of a state court of last resort would also appear to have an impact on entrepreneurship. These results are robust to a number of specifications.
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Judicial independence; Legal institutions; Legal quality; Economic growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 H11 L26 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0939362514001010
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecosys:v:39:y:2015:i:1:p:72-96
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecosys.2014.06.006
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Systems is currently edited by R. Frensch
More articles in Economic Systems from Elsevier Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().