National versus supranational bank regulation: Gains and losses of joining a banking union
Maria Näther and
Economic Systems, 2019, vol. 43, issue 1, 1-18
We ask how the structure of international banking affects the decision of a national regulator to join a banking union and to transfer regulatory powers to the supranational level. The focus is on bank supervision and bank resolution. A national regulator ignores possible gains or losses, which accrue to other jurisdictions if banks are internationally active. A supranational regulator takes these regulatory external effects into account. While supranational regulation improves total welfare, this is not necessarily the case for welfare in single countries. By analyzing the size and determinants of spillover effects we show how they constrain a country’s willingness to participate in a banking union. Our results may explain why some member states of the European Union currently hesitate to join the European Banking Union.
Keywords: Multinational banking; Banking union; Bank resolution; Single supervisory mechanism; Opt-in (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 D62 F21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecosys:v:43:y:2019:i:1:p:1-18
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Systems is currently edited by R. Frensch
More articles in Economic Systems from Elsevier Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().