Strategic location of firms: Does it empower bribe givers or bribe takers?

Rajeev Goel, Ummad Mazhar () and Serdar Sayan

Economic Systems, 2021, vol. 45, issue 3

Abstract: This paper uses survey data on the corruption experience (rather than corruption perceptions) of firms located in different types of cities in more than one hundred countries to analyze the impact of firms’ strategic location on corruption. In a corrupt economy, location might influence the ability of bureaucrats/politicians and firms to extract and dodge rents. Placing the analysis in the literature on determinants of corruption, our results reveal that the corruption experiences of firms located in nations’ capital cities are qualitatively different from firms located elsewhere: they do not experience greater corruption, while firms in large cities and main business cities do. However, when manufacturing and service firms are considered separately, their corruption experience and perceptions differ.

Keywords: Corruption experience; Corruption intensity; Bribery; Location; Capital city; Main business city; Large city (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 L29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecosys:v:45:y:2021:i:3:s0939362521000212

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecosys.2021.100873

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