Soft budgets and endogenous renegotiations in transport PPPs: An equilibrium analysis
Eduardo Engel (),
Ronald Fischer and
Economics of Transportation, 2019, vol. 17, issue C, 40-50
•Most countries keep PPP investments off balance sheet.•Governments renegotiate PPPs and use off-balance sheet finance to elude spending limits.•Future administrations pay a large fraction of the incumbent's additional spending.•Neither ex ante spending limits nor ex post competitive bidding for renegotiated contracts stem the tendency of the incumbent to bring forward infrastructure spending.
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