Soft budgets and endogenous renegotiations in transport PPPs: An equilibrium analysis

Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer and Alexander Galetovic

Economics of Transportation, 2019, vol. 17, issue C, 40-50

Abstract: •Most countries keep PPP investments off balance sheet.•Governments renegotiate PPPs and use off-balance sheet finance to elude spending limits.•Future administrations pay a large fraction of the incumbent's additional spending.•Neither ex ante spending limits nor ex post competitive bidding for renegotiated contracts stem the tendency of the incumbent to bring forward infrastructure spending.

Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecotra:v:17:y:2019:i:c:p:40-50

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2018.12.003

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