Economics at your fingertips  

Who gains and who loses from congestion pricing in a monocentric city with a bottleneck?

Yuki Takayama ()

Economics of Transportation, 2020, vol. 24, issue C

Abstract: This study develops a model in which heterogeneous commuters choose their residential locations and departure times from home in a monocentric city with a bottleneck. We show that commuters sort themselves both temporally and spatially according to their value of time and flexibility at the equilibria with and without optimal congestion pricing. These two equilibria exhibit fundamentally different properties, indicating that congestion pricing alters the urban spatial structure. We then consider two cases wherein richer commuters are either more flexible or less flexible and demonstrate that (a) congestion pricing makes cities denser and more compact in the former, whereas it causes cities to become less dense and to expand spatially in the latter; (b) in both cases, pricing helps rich commuters but hurts poor commuters. We further reveal that expanding capacity financed by the revenue from congestion pricing could be regressive in a city where richer commuters are less flexible.

Keywords: Peak-load pricing; Residential location; Distributional effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2020.100189

Access Statistics for this article

Economics of Transportation is currently edited by Mogens Fosgerau and Erik Verhoef

More articles in Economics of Transportation from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Page updated 2021-09-27
Handle: RePEc:eee:ecotra:v:24:y:2020:i:c:s2212012220301258