Flight cancellation as a reaction to the tarmac delay rule: An unintended consequence of enhanced passenger protection

Hideki Fukui and Koki Nagata

Economics of Transportation, 2014, vol. 3, issue 1, 29-44

Abstract: We examine the effects of the US DOT׳s tarmac delay rule (effective April 29, 2010) on flight cancellations and gate departure delays, using carrier-level panel data for the period between May 2008 and April 2012. Our results suggest the DOT׳s investigations of tarmac delay incidents triggered risk-averse behavior by investigated carriers, which increased flight cancellations and gate departure delays to avoid violating the rule. Carriers׳ preemptive flight cancellations are estimated to have affected about 308,900 passengers in 2011 alone. The results also suggest that these side effects persist for at least two years after the investigations, having larger adverse effects on passengers booked on the highest and lowest frequency routes. The costs and benefits of the rule need reevaluation.

Keywords: Tarmac delay rule; Flight cancellations; Departure delays; Risk-averse behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L93 L98 R40 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecotra:v:3:y:2014:i:1:p:29-44

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2014.02.004

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