The impact of residual government ownership in privatized firms: New evidence from China

Jing Liao and Martin Young

Emerging Markets Review, 2012, vol. 13, issue 3, 338-351

Abstract: This study investigates the determinants of residual government ownership and the impact of such ownership on post-privatization performance in China. Using hand collected data, we find that government shareholders are more likely to be present in small firms, while large firms are more likely to have politically connected CEOs on their boards. Contrary to the “political interference” hypothesis, our results show that residual government ownership has a positive impact on Tobin's Q. This study indicates that when the risk of expropriation by parent companies is high, government shareholders can add value to firms by signalling their commitment to privatization.

Keywords: Government ownership; Determinants; Performance; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1566014112000118
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ememar:v:13:y:2012:i:3:p:338-351

DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2012.02.004

Access Statistics for this article

Emerging Markets Review is currently edited by Jonathan A. Batten

More articles in Emerging Markets Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().