Corporate boards, large blockholders and executive compensation in banks: Evidence from Poland

Agnieszka Slomka-Golebiowska and Piotr Urbanek

Emerging Markets Review, 2016, vol. 28, issue C, 203-220

Abstract: The paper aims to investigate the impact of uniform board governance standards on the level of executive pay in banks with a controlling shareholder. Based on the sample of a hand-collected data on all executive pay of all public banks in Poland from 2005 to 2013, we find that board independence is negatively associated with executive compensation. In contrast to widely-held banks, independent directors in banks controlled by a blockholder provide restraint on the tendency to overcompensate. Thus, in concentrated ownership structure managerial power theory prevails over agency theory. However, the effect might be diluted as the number of board members increases.

Keywords: Executive compensation; Corporate governance; Ownership structure; Banking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ememar:v:28:y:2016:i:c:p:203-220

DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2016.08.001

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