 When secured and unsecured creditors recover the same: The emblematic case of the Tunisian corporate bankruptciesRégis Blazy and Aziza Letaief Emerging Markets Review, 2017, vol. 30, issue C, 19-41 Abstract: Bankruptcy is an essential screening mechanism for developing economies. This paper focuses on the way bankruptcy is managed in Tunisia, a country characterized by the importance of its banking sector. We collected data on a set of bankrupt firms (1995–2009). We address several questions. Do the Tunisian bankruptcy procedures generate substantial overall recoveries? Are the secured creditors (mostly banks) well-enough protected under bankruptcy, and do they influence the courts' decisions? To which extent the creditors compete together? The highest recoveries are found mostly under reorganization procedures. Yet, despite a high level of competition between the classes of claimholders, the secured creditors' recovery rate remains similar to one of the unsecured creditors. Last, the court's decision to liquidate/reorganize the debtor seems not influenced by the structure of claims. The likely consequences on development are twofold: higher risks of capital misallocation/credit rationing, and stronger incentives for the banks to prioritize informal workouts. Keywords: Bankruptcy; Creditors; Development; Tunisia; Heckman model; Propensity score (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ememar:v:30:y:2017:i:c:p:19-41 DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2016.08.021 Access Statistics for this article Emerging Markets Review is currently edited by Jonathan A. Batten More articles in Emerging Markets Review from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.