Controlling shareholder share pledging and firm cash dividends

Wanli Li, Jingting Zhou, Ziqiao Yan and He Zhang

Emerging Markets Review, 2020, vol. 42, issue C

Abstract: The study examines how share pledging behavior of controlling shareholder affects the corporate payout policy using the unique setting of Chinese market from 2008 to 2015. According to the study result, cash dividend payments for firms with shares pledged by controlling shareholders are significantly decreased relative to those without shares pledged, and the effect is stronger for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), firms with more related party transactions, and pledged shares with more magnitude, frequencies and maturity. Overall, these findings suggest that induced by the share pledging activity, controlling shareholders can obtain private benefits without considering benefits of outside shareholders.

Keywords: Share pledging; Cash dividend policy; Controlling shareholder; Tunneling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1566014119305199
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ememar:v:42:y:2020:i:c:s1566014119305199

DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2019.100671

Access Statistics for this article

Emerging Markets Review is currently edited by Jonathan A. Batten

More articles in Emerging Markets Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().