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Innovation quantity or quality? The role of political connections

Shiyuan Liu, Jiang Du, Weike Zhang, Xiaoli Tian and Gang Kou

Emerging Markets Review, 2021, vol. 48, issue C

Abstract: Based on the heterogeneity of innovation quantity and quality, this study investigates the impact of political connections on enterprises' innovation. Using the data of Chinese listed enterprises from 2003 to 2015, we find that political connections have a positive impact on enterprises' innovation quantity, but they are detrimental to innovation quality. We further find that political connections weaken the promotion of government subsidies on innovation quality and even reduce the R&D intensity of enterprises, which serves as an essential determinant of innovation quality. The government can stimulate enterprises' innovation quality by improving marketization, intellectual property protection, and anti-corruption.

Keywords: Political connections; Innovation quantity; Innovation quality; Innovation heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ememar:v:48:y:2021:i:c:s1566014121000273

DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2021.100819

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