Does government transparency shape firm decentralization? Evidence from a natural experiment in China
Ling Zhu and
Dongmin Kong
Emerging Markets Review, 2022, vol. 53, issue C
Abstract:
We take advantage of a recent pilot program of e-government reform in China to study whether and how government transparency affects firm decentralization. We construct a reasonable proxy of firm decentralization to reflect the allocation decision rights on the basis of China's unique setting of mandatory disclosure of financial statements of the parent firms and the entire corporation. We provide supports on the reliability of firm decentralization proxy and present strong evidence that the improvement of government transparency and accountability significantly enhances firm decentralization. A plausible mechanism is that such reform reshapes firms' external business environment and internal operating efficiency. Results are particularly pronounced for firms in areas with low social trust and high corporate attention. Overall, our findings contribute to the research on the effect of government quality on economic activities and organization delegation structure.
Keywords: Government transparency reform; Firm decentralization; Natural experiment; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1566014122000322
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ememar:v:53:y:2022:i:c:s1566014122000322
DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2022.100915
Access Statistics for this article
Emerging Markets Review is currently edited by Jonathan A. Batten
More articles in Emerging Markets Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().