The disciplinary effect of subordinated debt on bank risk taking

Tu Nguyen

Journal of Empirical Finance, 2013, vol. 23, issue C, 117-141

Abstract: Using data for publicly listed commercial banks and bank holding companies around the world, I investigate the disciplinary effect of subordinated debt on bank risk taking in the period 2002–2008. In addition, I examine whether this effect depends on national bank regulations and legal and institutional conditions. I provide evidence that subordinated debt has a mitigating effect on bank risk taking. Further, the results suggest a threshold level of national bank regulations and economic development above which subordinated debt mitigates risk taking. Overall, the evidence supports the efficacy of proposals calling for increased use of subordinated debt in banking firms.

Keywords: Financial crises; Bank regulation; Corporate governance; Market discipline; Subordinated debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G18 G21 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:empfin:v:23:y:2013:i:c:p:117-141

DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2013.05.005

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