EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Gentlemen do not talk about money: Remuneration dispersion and firm performance relationship on British boards

Anna Zalewska

Journal of Empirical Finance, 2014, vol. 27, issue C, 40-57

Abstract: Using a sample of 781 U.K. firms over the period 2000–2008 we study the relationship between remuneration dispersion at executive board level and firm performance. We find that this relationship is sensitive to nationality composition of the executive boards. In contrast with findings on American data, British companies are characterized by a negative dispersion–performance relationship, i.e., the greater the dispersion is, the worse firm performance is, however, boards with American CEOs or at least 30% of American nationality non-CEO executives are characterized by a positive dispersion–performance relationship. The results are robust when controlling for various firm, board and CEO characteristics, including cross-listing on U.S. exchanges and having sales in the U.S. Implications for executive remuneration reforms and board diversity are discussed.

Keywords: Executive compensation; Board diversity; Incentive pay; Firm performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G35 J33 L29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927539813000637
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:empfin:v:27:y:2014:i:c:p:40-57

DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2013.09.001

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Empirical Finance is currently edited by R. T. Baillie, F. C. Palm, Th. J. Vermaelen and C. C. P. Wolff

More articles in Journal of Empirical Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:empfin:v:27:y:2014:i:c:p:40-57