The effect of overvaluation on investment and accruals: The role of information

Shing-yang Hu, Yueh-Hsiang Lin and Christine W. Lai

Journal of Empirical Finance, 2016, vol. 38, issue PA, 181-201

Abstract: This paper examines whether the effect of overvaluation on accrual and investment is weak in a good information environment using the naive manager hypothesis and the monitoring hypothesis. The results show that CEOs recognize overvaluation and reduce their shareholdings regardless of the extent of the information environment and the naive manager hypothesis is not supported. However, managers in a good information environment do not respond to overvaluation with accrual or investment, and more institutional investors help to reduce overvaluation-driven behaviors. Thus, the monitoring hypothesis is supported. These findings are free from causality concerns and robust for alternative measures of misvaluation.

Keywords: Accrual; Earnings management; Capital investment; Misvaluation; Information; Governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G34 M40 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:empfin:v:38:y:2016:i:pa:p:181-201

DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2016.06.004

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