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Opting out of good governance

C. Fritz Foley, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, Jonathan Greenstein and Eric Zwick

Journal of Empirical Finance, 2018, vol. 46, issue C, 93-110

Abstract: Cross-listing on a US exchange does not force foreign firms to follow the exchange’s corporate governance rules. Hand-collected data show that 80% of cross-listed firms opt out of at least one exchange governance rule and those that opt out have a smaller share of independent directors. Cross-listed firms opt out more when coming from countries with weak corporate governance rules, but if these firms are growing and need external financing, they are more likely to comply. For firms in such countries, opting out also lowers firm valuations, decreases the value of cash holdings, and reduces investment sensitivity to market valuations.

Keywords: Cross-listing; ADR; Governance; Boards; Law and finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Opting Out of Good Governance (2014) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2017.12.004

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