Exploring the dynamics of low-carbon technology diffusion among enterprises: An evolutionary game model on a two-level heterogeneous social network
Muhammad Shahbaz () and
Energy Economics, 2021, vol. 101, issue C
For mitigating carbon emissions, series of policies have been formulated by governments to promote the diffusion of low-carbon technologies (LCTs). Enterprises' strategic choices and consumers' decisions have a pivotal impact on LCT diffusion. In this context, this study builds an evolutionary game model based on a social network comprised of two sub-networks with different typologies, which respectively depict the connections of enterprises and consumers. Enterprises choose to produce either low-carbon or un-low-carbon products according to the evolutionary game theory. Consumers purchase preferable products repeatedly according to their demands. Using the model, this research explores the impacts of carbon taxes, subsidies, and the demand for low-carbon products. The results show that carbon taxes have increasing marginal effectiveness in promoting LCT diffusion; high carbon taxes can mitigate the fluctuations of LCT diffusion caused by consumers' repeat purchases; while using the data from the electric vehicle industry, enterprises do not manifest high sensitivity to mild carbon taxation. Different from taxation, the effectiveness of subsidization diminishes and results in inefficiency. A large demand for low-carbon products can prominently stimulate enterprises to adopt LCTs. However, if demand increases from a low level, the fluctuation of LCT diffusion is magnified. This magnification does not last if demand continues to increase.
Keywords: Low-carbon technology diffusion; Agent-based modeling; Complex network; Evolutionary game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:101:y:2021:i:c:s014098832100298x
Access Statistics for this article
Energy Economics is currently edited by R. S. J. Tol, Beng Ang, Lance Bachmeier, Perry Sadorsky, Ugur Soytas and J. P. Weyant
More articles in Energy Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().