Developing hydrogen refueling stations: An evolutionary game approach and the case of China

Tian Zhao, Zhixin Liu and Tooraj Jamasb

Energy Economics, 2022, vol. 115, issue C

Abstract: Diffusion of hydrogen refueling stations (HRS) is key for promotion of hydrogen vehicles. We explore the nexus between critical stakeholders in the HRS industry from a game perspective. We model the three main actors in the policy for the development of HRS in Chinese hydrogen pilot cities, i.e. the public sector, the private investor, and the consumer. The tripartite evolutionary game analyzes the interaction of subsidy provision, HRS investment, and fuel consumption. We examine the evolutionary stable strategy of the system and propose a policy mechanism for setting the values of key parameters to promote active cooperation in the HRS diffusion. The simulation validates the equilibrium solution of the game, performs sensitivity analyses of initial probabilities and key parameters, and obtains the threshold values of subsidy and hydrogen price triggering a cooperative behavior. Furthermore, we find that, while there are several ways to stimulate cooperation such as subsidy provision and cost reduction, boosting the initial probabilities of actors to choose cooperative strategies is most effective for leading the game system to the ideal outcome. Accordingly, we offer recommendations on how to improve the actors' initial willingness to cooperate by enhancing the formulation and enforcement of regulations.

Keywords: Hydrogen refueling stations; Evolutionary game; Numerical simulation; Chinese hydrogen pilot cities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 Q42 Q48 R42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988322005199
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:115:y:2022:i:c:s0140988322005199

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2022.106390

Access Statistics for this article

Energy Economics is currently edited by R. S. J. Tol, Beng Ang, Lance Bachmeier, Perry Sadorsky, Ugur Soytas and J. P. Weyant

More articles in Energy Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().