A note on the uniqueness of Nash–Cournot equilibria in an oligopolistic energy market with renewable generation and demand uncertainty

Benjamin Chaiken and Joseph E. Duggan

Energy Economics, 2024, vol. 138, issue C

Abstract: This work explores the uniqueness of Nash–Cournot equilibria in wholesale electricity markets with both thermal and renewable generation in the presence of demand uncertainty. Criteria guaranteeing a unique equilibrium are derived for an energy market where each firm owns a share of renewable generation. This work expands upon the uniqueness results proven by Lagerlöf (2006) to incorporate the presence of renewable generation into the market in the manner of Acemoglu et al. (2017). A numerical case study is used to illustrate the potential impacts of increasing renewable generation on equilibrium uniqueness and directions for future research are discussed.

Keywords: Nash–Cournot equilibrium; Electricity market design; Renewable generation; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L94 Q41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:138:y:2024:i:c:s0140988324005577

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107849

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