 Endowment effects, expectations, and trading behavior in carbon cap and tradeBeomseok Yoon, Mateusz Filipski, Craig Landry and Seung Jick Yoo Energy Economics, 2024, vol. 139, issue C Abstract: We explain agents' trading behaviors and market outcomes in the presence of endowment effects intensified by expectations-based loss aversion in carbon cap and trade. Building on Kőszegi and Rabin (2006)’s model with forward-looking reference points, we show how firms' concerns about high future compliance costs (through loss aversion and uncertainty) can cause a gap between Willingness-to-Pay and Willingness-to-Accept for allowances. This leads to limited allowance trading and deviation from the socially desirable paths. The problem can be exacerbated under a substantial proportion of free allocation, a fixed (or inflexible) cap as well as uncertain regulatory ambitions, particularly in emerging economies under a variety of uncertainty. Recognizing the regulator's role in dealing with firms' expectations (or concerns) and facilitating innovation investments, we discuss potential alternative systems (e.g., with auction and flexible supply) for decarbonization that incorporate flexibility in terms of innovation timing and realized costs. Keywords: Cap and trade; Endowment effect; Expectation; Reference-dependent; Loss aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:139:y:2024:i:c:s0140988324006352 DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107927 Access Statistics for this article Energy Economics is currently edited by R. S. J. Tol, Beng Ang, Lance Bachmeier, Perry Sadorsky, Ugur Soytas and J. P. Weyant More articles in Energy Economics from Elsevier |
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