 The hidden costs of tariff misclassification: Structural winners and losersHector Sandoval, Pedro Hancevic and Hernán Bejarano Energy Economics, 2025, vol. 144, issue C Abstract: We propose an empirical model to evaluate firms’ choices in electric tariff contracting. By combining novel data from the Non-residential Electricity Consumption Survey with utility billing data from the state-owned national utility provider, we analyze two pathological situations revealed by the electric bills of commercial and service SMEs in Aguascalientes, Mexico. First, despite being banned, many firms pay the residential tariff. Among these firms, some pay the regular subsidized rate, while others pay the high-demand rate, which is higher than the corresponding business rate. Additionally, for another group of companies, there are two competing business tariffs, many of which are misclassified and thus must be re-categorized to afford less expensive electric bills. A rich set of explanatory variables is used to quantify the two biases, explain the wrong decisions, estimate hidden costs and subsidies at the national level, and provide valuable policy implications. Keywords: Tariff misclassification; Firm behavior; Electricity consumption; Self-selection; Sub-optimal choice; Illegal behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:144:y:2025:i:c:s0140988325001458 DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108322 Access Statistics for this article Energy Economics is currently edited by R. S. J. Tol, Beng Ang, Lance Bachmeier, Perry Sadorsky, Ugur Soytas and J. P. Weyant More articles in Energy Economics from Elsevier |
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