Congestion management rules and trading strategies in the Spanish electricity market

Dolores Furió and Julio J. Lucia

Energy Economics, 2009, vol. 31, issue 1, 48-60

Abstract: This paper analyses the economic incentives embodied in the rules governing the resolution of transmission constraints in the Spanish wholesale electricity market and the way these incentives may have influenced on the trading behaviour of both the generators and the demand side. The evidence obtained is consistent with them responding to these incentives. In particular, buyers would respond to the way congestion costs are billed to them by abandoning the daily market in favour of the intraday market as far as possible. Additionally, some strategic generators may have been prompted the system operator to require them to inject electricity into the system to solve network congestions. Finally, these results may contribute to shed light on what should be expected of the reform in the aforementioned rules.

Keywords: Wholesale; electricity; market; regulation; Transmission; constraints; Strategic; bidding; Market; power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:31:y:2009:i:1:p:48-60

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