Bundling and Mergers in Energy Markets

Laurent Granier and Marion Podesta ()

Energy Economics, 2010, vol. 32, issue 6, 1316-1324

Abstract: Does bundling trigger mergers in energy industries? We observe mergers between firms belonging to various energy markets, for instance between gas and electricity providers. These mergers enable firms to bundle. We consider two horizontally differentiated markets. In this framework, we show that bundling strategies in energy markets create incentives to form multi-market firms in order to supply bi-energy packages. Moreover, we find that this type of merger is detrimental to social welfare.

Keywords: Product; Bundling; Endogenous; Mergers; Energy; Markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Working Paper: Bundling and Mergers in Energy Markets (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:32:y:2010:i:6:p:1316-1324

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