 Evaluating the regulator: Winners and losers in the regulation of Spanish electricity distributionLeticia Blázquez-Gómez and Emili Grifell-Tatje Energy Economics, 2011, vol. 33, issue 5, 807-815 Abstract: The principal aim of this study is to evaluate the regulation of electricity distribution in Spain. To this end, we begin by analyzing whether the changes introduced by the regulator led distribution companies to improve their efficiency; we then address whether the reimbursements paid to the distribution companies are linked to efficiency; lastly, we examine whether consumers benefited from the efficiency improvements. We focus on Spain because the electricity regulator in that country is a longstanding pioneer in the implementation of incentive-based regulatory models. Our analysis was implemented using the regulatory model proposed by Bogetoft (1997) as a benchmark. The results show that the Spanish electricity regulator did not establish a link between efficiency and the reimbursements paid to electricity companies; in addition, the electricity companies benefited to the detriment of consumers. Keywords: Efficiency; analysis; Regulation; by; incentives; Spanish; electricity; distribution; Yardstick; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:33:y:2011:i:5:p:807-815 Access Statistics for this article Energy Economics is currently edited by R. S. J. Tol, Beng Ang, Lance Bachmeier, Perry Sadorsky, Ugur Soytas and J. P. Weyant More articles in Energy Economics from Elsevier |
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