Atmospheric externalities and environmental taxation

Agnar Sandmo

Energy Economics, 2011, vol. 33, issue S1, S4-S12

Abstract: The paper reviews the theory of environmental taxation under first best and second best conditions. It argues that negative environmental externalities lead to reductions of the provision of public goods, while investment in abatement increases the supply of public goods. Together with optimal tax rules, the paper therefore also derives conditions for the optimal use of resources on abatement. After brief discussions of the dimensions of time and uncertainty, tax reform and the double dividend, and taxes vs. quotas, the optimal tax model is applied to the problem of global warming with a discussion of the particular incentive problems that arise in designing and implementing global climate policy.

Keywords: Externalities; Public goods; Optimal taxation; Climate change (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 H41 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988311001514
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Atmospheric Externalities and Environmental Taxation (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:33:y:2011:i:s1:p:s4-s12

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2011.07.021

Access Statistics for this article

Energy Economics is currently edited by R. S. J. Tol, Beng Ang, Lance Bachmeier, Perry Sadorsky, Ugur Soytas and J. P. Weyant

More articles in Energy Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().