Cartelization in gas markets: Studying the potential for a “Gas OPEC”

S.A. Gabriel, Knut Einar Rosendahl, Rudolf Egging-Bratseth, H.G. Avetisyan and Sauleh Siddiqui ()

Energy Economics, 2012, vol. 34, issue 1, 137-152

Abstract: Natural gas is increasingly important as a fuel for electric power generation as well as other uses due to its environmental advantage over other fossil fuels. Using the World Gas Model, a large-scale energy equilibrium system based on a complementarity formulation, this paper analyzes possible future gas cartels and their effects on gas markets in a number of regions across the world. In addition, scenarios related to lower transport costs and decreased unconventional gas supply in the United States are considered.

Keywords: Natural gas; Market equilibrium; Complementarity model; Energy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C00 C6 C7 D4 F5 Q4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Working Paper: Cartelization in gas markets. Studying the potential for a "Gas OPEC" (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:34:y:2012:i:1:p:137-152

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2011.05.014

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