Strategic Eurasian natural gas market model for energy security and policy analysis: Formulation and application to South Stream

Chi Kong Chyong and Benjamin Hobbs ()

Energy Economics, 2014, vol. 44, issue C, 198-211

Abstract: The mathematical formulation of a strategic Eurasian natural gas market model is presented. The model represents horizontal oligopolistic relationships among producers, bilateral market power between producer (Russia) and transit (Ukraine) countries, detailed transport constraints, and operation decisions over a 20year time horizon. To demonstrate the model's capabilities, a financial and market analysis of the proposed South Stream gas pipeline from Russia via the Black Sea to South Europe is summarized. Insights obtained include the following. First, expectations of high demand growth in Europe and/or transit risks do not justify the construction of the South Stream pipeline because under all demand and Ukraine transit interruption scenarios, the net benefits to the South Stream participants are negative (the NPV ranges from −$1.9billion (bn) to −$7.4bn). Second, Ukraine's perception of high transit market power vis-à-vis Russia may trigger the construction of the otherwise unprofitable South Stream project. Thus, under Ukraine's high transit market power scenario, the NPV of South Stream ranges between $2.4bn and $24.5bn. Third, we find that the South Stream investment increases the efficiency of the European gas market under the following conditions: (i) when gas demand in Europe grows 2% per year up to 2030, (ii) when Ukraine poses high transit market power, or (iii) under a combination of severe transit risks through Ukraine and low demand scenarios in Europe. It should be noted that the value of South Stream to both its project sponsors and the market as a whole is much higher when Ukraine exercises transit market power than under the high demand scenario. Therefore, whether Ukraine is likely to wield market power is crucial to the success of the South Stream project because that is the only scenario in which the project yields both a positive expected NPV to its sponsors and the highest value to the market as a whole.

Keywords: Natural gas; Computational market equilibrium; Complementarity model; Nord Stream; South Stream; Gazprom; Energy security; Market power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C72 H43 L13 L95 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:44:y:2014:i:c:p:198-211

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2014.04.006

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