Electricity market-clearing prices and investment incentives: The role of pricing rules

Ignacio Herrero, Pablo Rodilla and Carlos Batlle

Energy Economics, 2015, vol. 47, issue C, 42-51

Abstract: Pricing rules in wholesale electricity markets are usually classified around two major groups, namely linear (aka non-discriminatory) and non-linear (aka discriminatory). As well known, the major difference lies on the way non-convexities are considered in the computation of market prices.

Keywords: Electricity market design; Marginal pricing; Long-term capacity expansion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C63 D41 L11 Q41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:47:y:2015:i:c:p:42-51

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2014.10.024

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