Hydro resource management, risk aversion and equilibrium in an incomplete electricity market setting

Pablo Rodilla, Javier García-González, Álvaro Baíllo, Santiago Cerisola and Carlos Batlle

Energy Economics, 2015, vol. 51, issue C, 365-382

Abstract: Since the outset of power system reform, one of the main objectives of regulation has been to assess whether the market, of its own accord, can induce agents to adopt decisions that maximise social welfare.

Keywords: Medium-term planning; Electricity markets; Regulatory intervention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C57 C72 D41 D52 D81 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:51:y:2015:i:c:p:365-382

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2015.07.002

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