 Strategic oil stockpiling for energy security: The case of China and IndiaXiao-Bing Zhang, Ping Qin and Xiaolan Chen Energy Economics, 2017, vol. 61, issue C, 253-260 Abstract: Compared with the developed countries, the developing countries could be more vulnerable to oil supply disruptions due to their lack of strategic petroleum reserves (SPRs). Several developing countries, including China and India, are establishing their SPRs to ensure energy security. In the common world oil market, one country's SPR decisions can be affected by the decisions of other countries. This paper investigates the SPR policies of China and India, two of the largest developing countries, in a game-theoretic framework, where the interactions between the two countries are taken into account. The results show that players' equilibrium stockpiling strategies and total expected costs could vary significantly with the initial oil market state, stockpile acquisition capacity and the probabilities for disruptions to persist. Keywords: Strategic petroleum reserve; Dynamic game; Energy security; Developing countries (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:61:y:2017:i:c:p:253-260 DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2016.11.021 Access Statistics for this article Energy Economics is currently edited by R. S. J. Tol, Beng Ang, Lance Bachmeier, Perry Sadorsky, Ugur Soytas and J. P. Weyant More articles in Energy Economics from Elsevier |
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