Oil import tariff game for energy security: The case of China and India

Xiao-Bing Zhang, Xinye Zheng, Ping Qin and Lunyu Xie

Energy Economics, 2018, vol. 72, issue C, 255-262

Abstract: This paper investigates the optimal quota/tariff polices for China and India, two of the biggest developing countries who are facing the threat of possible oil supply disruptions, with taking into their possible interactions in the common world oil market. Our results indicate that the smaller (oil-importing) country may have higher incentive to free ride on the quota/tariff policy of the larger country. Besides, the optimal tariffs for the two countries would be larger in the cooperative case than those in the non-cooperative case. Moreover, the benefits of cooperation would be larger with a ‘disrupted’ market state than that with a ‘normal’ market state, which is reflective of the fact that it is more necessary and important to cooperate when the market state is worse.

Keywords: Oil import tariff; Energy security; Developing countries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P48 Q41 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:72:y:2018:i:c:p:255-262

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2018.03.035

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