EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The role of governmental commitment on regulated utilities

Martin C. De Meio Reggiani, Miguel Vazquez, Michelle Hallack and Nélida B. Brignole

Energy Economics, 2019, vol. 84, issue C

Abstract: Regulation is generally interpreted as a relational contract between governments and private companies. Besides, regulation plays either a positive or a negative role in infrastructure development. This article is intended to understand the hindrance to stable policies in the regulation of network infrastructures. An original model where governments have a conflictive relationship with regulated companies was developed. The governmental opportunistic behaviour, which undermines the regulatory independence, was introduced in an infinitely repeated game. By including this variation, the hold-up problem can be modelled since a time inconsistency may occur. The model was illustrated using past-decade events about the Argentinean transport network of natural gas, proposing a possible reason for the triggering of a sustained hold-up.

Keywords: Regulation; Hold-Up; Natural gas transport (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014098831930307X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:84:y:2019:i:c:s014098831930307x

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104518

Access Statistics for this article

Energy Economics is currently edited by R. S. J. Tol, Beng Ang, Lance Bachmeier, Perry Sadorsky, Ugur Soytas and J. P. Weyant

More articles in Energy Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:84:y:2019:i:c:s014098831930307x