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Nudging the poor and the rich – A field study on the distributional effects of green electricity defaults

Claus Ghesla, Manuel Grieder and Renate Schubert

Energy Economics, 2020, vol. 86, issue C

Abstract: Choice defaults are an increasingly popular public policy tool. Yet there is little knowledge of the distributional consequences of such nudges for different groups in society. We report results from an elicitation study in the residential electricity market in Switzerland in which we contrast consumers' actual contract choices under an existing default regime with the same consumers' active choices in a survey presenting the same choice-set without any default. We find that the default is successful at curbing greenhouse gas emissions, but it leads poorer households to pay more for their electricity consumption than they would want to, while leaving a significant willingness to pay for green electricity by richer households untapped.

Keywords: Choice defaults; Welfare; Green electricity; Public policy; Nudging (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D12 D31 D61 D63 H23 M38 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:86:y:2020:i:c:s014098831930413x

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104616

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