Competitive retail electricity market under continuous price regulation
Chen-Hao Tsai and
Energy Policy, 2018, vol. 114, issue C, 274-287
The introduction of retail competition in various states in United States was expected to lower electricity bills, expand the choice set of consumers, and encourage horizontal differentiation by providing value-added services. However, to date, most regulators in states with retail choice often maintain their interventions on retail electricity rates, particularly for residential consumers. In this paper, we use data from the State of Connecticut as a case study to describe a competitive retail electricity market under continuous price regulation, and discuss policy implications.
Keywords: L81; L94; Q49; Electricity market; Retail choice; Standard Service (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:114:y:2018:i:c:p:274-287
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