The impact of the under enforcement of RPS in China: An evolutionary approach

Debin Fang, Chaoyang Zhao and Andrew N. Kleit

Energy Policy, 2019, vol. 135, issue C

Abstract: The implementation of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) in China is limited by the interests of the sector being regulated. Power companies generally lack the incentive to generate renewable power. They can be expected to resist the implementation of RPS standards, which will in turn affect the successful implementation of the RPS policy. Thus studying the strategic interaction and co-evolution between the government and power companies under the RPS regulation is of great importance.

Keywords: Renewable portfolio standard (RPS); Regulation; Evolutionary game; Subsidy and punishment mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:135:y:2019:i:c:s0301421519306081

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111021

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