A “parasite market”: A competitive market of energy price comparison websites reduces consumer welfare

Miklós Antal

Energy Policy, 2020, vol. 138, issue C

Abstract: This article is about energy price comparison websites (PCWs). Using the example of Great Britain, it studies whether a competitive market of energy PCWs or a single non-commercial PCW can serve consumers better. Results are unambiguous. Households currently pay more than £100 million per year through their energy bills to commercial energy PCWs. The business model of these PCWs is largely based on creating deviations from consumer choice considered ideal by the regulator. As a result, people overpay for energy and retail market competition is adversely affected. Furthermore, commercial PCWs do not efficiently increase consumer engagement, so more households are on expensive tariffs than in the alternative system. Commercial PCWs also introduce a number of risks. As trade-offs in the competitive case are unavoidable, regulatory changes cannot make the market better than the one-non-profit-site solution. A single non-commercial PCW, such as the one operated by Citizens Advice, can provide a higher quality service at a substantially lower cost. Therefore, the interests of consumers can best be protected by shutting down commercial PCWs. A theoretical insight is that a competitive market of PCWs emerges if not explicitly prohibited by regulation, but reduces consumer welfare: this should be considered a “parasite market”.

Keywords: Price comparison website; Electronic intermediary; Info-mediation; Two-sided market; Consumer benefit; Monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:138:y:2020:i:c:s0301421519308109

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111228

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