Predicting collusive patterns in a liberalized electricity market with mandatory auctions of forward contracts

Sebastián M. Palacio

Energy Policy, 2020, vol. 139, issue C

Abstract: In this paper, the main objective is to analyze the effect of the introduction of regulated long-term tariffs in liberalized electricity generation markets, which are supposed to guarantee reasonable and predictable prices to consumers. Several authors have argued that the introduction of this kind of regulation increases competition and leads to offer prices closer to marginal costs.

Keywords: Collusion; Auction; Electricity market; Long-term contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:139:y:2020:i:c:s0301421520300690

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111311

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