A time-based pricing game in a competitive vehicle market regarding the intervention of carbon emission reduction

Junhai Ma, Yaming Hou, Wenhui Yang and Yi Tian

Energy Policy, 2020, vol. 142, issue C

Abstract: As the environmental issues become increasingly severe, great attention has been paid to the development of electric vehicles. In order to better develop the green economy, this paper studies a supply-chain system under policy intervention, which is composed of strategic customers, the government, two manufacturers which respectively produce electric vehicles and fuel vehicles. The paper aims to research the impacts of pricing time on profitability and stability. The different timing patterns of pricing divide into two game structures, namely Stackelberg pricing game and simultaneous pricing game. With the adjustment of parameters, the state of the system is switched between stability and instability, so some effective methods are lead-in to analysis it. Analytic results reveal how subsidy and carbon emission constraint affect supply-chain system operation, since the whole market operation lasts for a long term, subsidy may always have negative impact on the system's stability, which may drive the system operation to be uncontrollable. By comparison, Stackelberg pricing strategy with characteristics of time-delay is more adaptable for system operational management, which makes the system more flexible to adjust supply-chain system status in time.

Keywords: Dynamic complexity; Stackelberg pricing model; Simultaneous pricing model; Information entropy; Policy intervention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:enepol:v:142:y:2020:i:c:s0301421520301932

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111440

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